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We examine the extent of gerrymandering for the 2010 General As-
sembly district map of Wisconsin. We find that there is substantial
variability in the election outcome depending on what maps are used.
We also found robust evidence that the district maps are highly ger-
rymandered and that this gerrymandering likely altered the partisan
make up of the Wisconsin General Assembly in some elections. Com-
pared to the distribution of possible redistricting plans for the Gen-
eral Assembly, Wisconsin’s chosen plan is an outlier in that it yields
results that are highly skewed to the Republicans when the statewide
proportion of Democratic votes comprises more than 50-52% of the
overall vote (with the precise threshold depending on the election
considered). Wisconsin’s plan acts to preserve the Republican ma-
jority by providing extra Republican seats even when the Democratic
vote increases into the range when the balance of power would shift
for the vast majority of redistricting plans.
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We generate an ensemble of 19,184 redistricting plans drawnfrom a distribution placed on redistricting plans of the state
of Wisconsin. The probability distribution used is concentrated on
redistricting plans that satisfy design criteria laid out in the Wisconsin
constitution, statutes, and relevant court cases: compactness and
contiguity of districts, equal partition of votes, resistance to splitting
counties across districts, and compliance with the Voting Rights Act
(VRA). With the possible exception of satisfying the VRA, none of
these design criteria have any partisan tilt.
We explore three basic questions: the variability of elections re-
sults across redistricting plans; the degree to which the Wisconsin Act
43 is typical or an outlier with respect to its partisan bias; and lastly,
the structural source of any bias.
Our approach has a number of inherent advantages. We do not
presume any notion of proportional representation based on statewide
vote counts. By sampling, we are able to factor in the inherent geopo-
litical structure of the state such as the concentration of Democrats
in urban areas or the existence of geographic elements that constrain
redistricting plans. Such features might produce basic asymmetries in
the number of representatives elected as a function of the statewide
votes. We make no symmetry assumptions and our methods naturally
adapt to the geometry of population distributions of the state.
In Section 1, we discuss how the election results may vary depend-
ing on the restricting maps used. In Sections 2 and 3, we explore the
geopolitical structure of Wisconsin and give graphical aids for under-
standing and detecting gerrymandering. In Section 4, we explore a
number of summary statistics which quantify the understanding and
insights developed in Sections 2 and 3.
We find that the Wisconsin redistricting plan is highly gerryman-
dered and less representative than at least 99% of all plans in our
ensemble and shows more Republican bias than over 99% of the
plans. The gerrymandering results are stable over a number of differ-
ent sets of votes and years. These results are summarized in Tables 1
and 2 in Section 4. These results further suggest that the election
outcomes produced by the Wisconsin maps systematically become
less representative of our ensemble as the overall percentage of Re-
publican votes decreases to 50% and below. This is further supported
by graphical analysis in Figures 3–7 in Section 3. The Act 43 map
acts as a kind of firewall, keeping a Republican Assembly majority
in place even as voter preferences becomes increasingly Democratic.
In Figure 9, we show that there is a fundamental asymmetry in the
geopolitical structure of Wisconsin as most of the redistricting maps
in our ensemble require less than 50% of the votes to be Republican to
make equal the chance of either party being in the legislative majority.
Nonetheless, the Act 43 map is again a clear outlier in favor of the
Republicans as it requires a much lower percentage of Republican
votes to produce an equal chance of having a legislative majority.
In Section 5, we discribe how the ensemble is generated by Markov
Chain Monte Carlo. In Section 7, we give evidence that our results are
robust and that the algorithm is sufficiently converged. In particular
we show that the our all of our results remain unchanged when a larger
ensemble of 84,500 redistricting plans is used. In Sections 6 and 8,
we make some technical comments about data curation.
This report continues our work started in (1–3). It is related to
other works on sampling and computation in the redistricting context
(4–11). In particular, the recent papers (12, 13) apply sampling to the
Wisconsin redistricting setting that we consider here.
1. The Inherent Variability of Election Results
For each redistricting plan in the ensemble, the outcome of the election
is computed using votes from either the Wisconsin General Assembly
elections from 2012 (denoted WSA12), from 2014 (denoted WSA16)
and from 2016 (denoted WSA16). In all cases, the actual votes were
used at the ward level. However, the existence of unopposed races
necessitated interpolating the data using votes from other elections
in a number of wards: 27% in WSA12, 46% in WSA14, and 49%
in WSA16. The details of this interpolation are given in Section 6,
but the vote counts are based on actual Wisconsin election data in the
years given.
Figure 1 shows the frequency of different election outcomes in our
ensemble using the votes from WSA12, WSA14, and WSA16. Across
the redistricting plans for the 99-seat Wisconsin General Assembly,
the expected number of seats won by Republicans was typically con-
centrated within a range of 3-5 seats. However, a small proportion of
redistricting plans are outliers, which extend the range to as much as
10 seats. This wide range of possible outcomes shows that the state’s
choice of redistricting plan can have an effect on the same order as
the typical changes in the popular vote across elections (e.g. a swing
of 60 to 64 elected Republicans from 2012 to 2016 in the Wisconsin
General Assembly). The fact that the different redistricting plans
in the ensemble give such different results speaks to the need for a
concept of acceptable redistricting, lest the state’s redistricting exer-
cise become as, or more important than, the democratic expression of
voters.
While the precise definition of a typical result may be debatable,
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Fig. 1. Distribution of election outcomes in the ensemble of 19,184 redistricting plans,
interpolated for the WSA12, WSA14, and WSA16 election data. With a fixed number
and location of votes, the outcome of the election varies based on the choice of
redistricting plan chosen.
it is clear that some extreme ranges clearly represent anomalous
behavior: the results should be labeled as outliers. The view that some
points would clearly be labeled as outliers is the starting point for our
analysis.
2. Situating the Wisconsin Act 43 Redistricting in the
Ensemble
We now turn to situating the actual redistricting plan established by
Act 43 of the 2011 Wisconsin General Assembly within our ensemble
of 19, 184 redistricting plans. This was the redistricting plan actually
used in the WSA12, WSA14, and WSA16 elections. The annotation
“WI” on each plot in Figure 2 indicates the number of seats produced
by this redistricting. We note that the use of our modified election
data in 2012 and 2014, which interpolates the missing data caused
by unopposed races, does not change the balance of power. However,
in 2016 the results of the actual election differed from those our
interpolated vote data produces. The actual results had three fewer
Republican seats than the interpolated results would have had, due to
unopposed races in which Democrats ran unopposed in districts that
tended to vote Republican. The number of unopposed races was least
in 2012 with 27%, growing to 46% in 2014, and then to 49% in 2016.
Any reasonable sense of outlier would label the Wisconsin result
in 2012 as anomalous. Yet, the actual result produced by the same
map is well within the distribution for 2014 and 2016, in which
the Republican share of the vote was considerably higher. As we
see below, this behavior turns out to reflects an unusual property of
Wisconsin’s redistricting plan: it gives an anomalously high number
of seats to Republicans in elections in which Democrats perform
well, but a typical number of seats in elections in which Republicans
perform well.
To better understand this situation, we consider the outcome that
would occur if votes from a number of other elections were used as
if they had been cast for the Wisconsin General Assembly. Specifi-
cally we compare the effect of using results from U.S. House, U.S.
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Fig. 2. Distribution of election outcomes in the ensemble of 19,184 redistricting plans,
interpolated for the WSA12, WSA14, and WSA16 election data. The outcome using
the Wisconsin Act 43 redistricting is marked with “WI”. For the WSA16 outcome, there
were three unopposed Democrats that ran in districts that voted more Republican
across the interpolated data; thus we have marked the actual result (64), along with
the interpolated result (67).
Senate, and Presidential elections from 2012, 2014, and 2016 in ad-
dition to our interpolated results for WSA12, WSA14, and WSA16.
Figure 3 presents an interesting trend: whenever the election would
have typically produced around 55 or fewer Republican seats, the
Wisconsin plan behaves very anomalously in the sense that it is far to
the right in the histogram. In fact, even though the expected number
of Republican seats falls below 50 in one election and the statewide
percentage of Republican votes falls well below 50% in three elec-
tions, the number of seats elected stays pinned in the high 50s; it is
almost constant despite the fact that the Republican vote continues to
fall as one moves down the plot.
The plot shows that to determine whether the outcome of a given
map will be anomalous for a particular election, it is not enough to
consider only the total vote count or expected number of seats. The
USH12 and WSA12 are similar by those two metrics, yet the outcome
in the first is typical but the second is anomalous. This detail shows
the importance of the geopolitical structure of the votes in determining
the outcome and the pitfalls of coarse, global measures.
Based on these insights, we propose a method to evaluate the
extent to which a state redistricting plan is an outlier with respect to
its ability to protect a party from losing seats: we examine the impact
of shifting the proportion of votes up or down within each election
examined. We shift the proportions in WSA14 and WSA16 uniformly
up and down in all districts so that the statewide Republican vote
fraction varies from 45% to 55%. We then plot the histograms and
the election results for each shifted vote count in Figure 4.
Unlike the plots in Figure 3, the geopolitical structure of all of
these shifted votes is identical. Both plots in Figure 4 exhibit the trend
we already observed in Figure 3. As the percentage of Republican
votes decreases, the election results for both WSA14 and WSA16
(shown with red dots in Figure 4) move from being representative
2 | Herschlag et al.
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Fig. 3. A number of election seat result histograms situated on a larger plot by the
number Republican seats and the overall fraction of Republican vote. The circles
mark the outcome using the Wisconsin Act 43 redistricting. Election plotted: Wis-
consin State Assembly 2012 (WSA12), Wisconsin State Assembly 2016 (WSA16),
Presidential 2012 (PRE12), Presidential 2016 (PRE16), US House 2012 (USH12),
US House 2014 (USH14), US Senate 2012 (USS12), US Senate 2016 (USS16),
Wisconsin Secretary of State 2014 (SOS14)
(located in the center of the histograms) to being outliers (located in
the extrema of the histograms).
The Wisconsin redistricting seems to create a firewall which resists
Republicans falling below 50 seats. The effect is striking around the
mark of 60 seats where the number of Republican seats remains
constant, despite the fraction of votes dropping from 51% to 48%.
Figure 5 gives a more stylized version of Figure 4. Rather than the
entire histogram, we plot the mean, variance, a region containing 90%
of all sampled redistricting plans, and the extrema for a larger number
of finer shifts that swing the election 10 percentage points in both
directions of the observed result. The fine black line gives the number
of seats produced by the Wisconsin Act 43 redistricting. Though the
local geography of the votes in the three elections is different, each
produces a clear deviation from the typical results starting around
50%. This deviation continues as the fraction of Republican votes
decreases. All three elections (especially WSA14 and WSA16) show
a significant range of Republican votes where the partisan outcome of
the election (expressed in the number of Republican seats) does not
change even though the percentage of the Republican votes decreases
substantially.
Finally, we seek to summarize the extent to which Wisconsin’s
redistricting plan is an outlier (compared to the ensemble of redistrict-
ing plans). Toward this end, we defined a statistic as follows: for each
of various shifts around an equally split election, we (i) calculate the
extent to which a state’s redistricting plan produces results different
from the results produced by the distribution of possible redistricting
plans, and (ii) take the average across the shifts. For any election, we
then measure the extent to which a state’s plan is outlier with respect
to it statistic. (See Section 4 for more details.) As show in Figure 6,
we find that the Wisconsin plan is an extreme outlier. In each of the
three elections (2012, 2014, and 2016), it is more extreme than 99% of
all possible redistricting plans in our ensemble (See the values ofH in
Table 2 in Section 4). This statistic is essentially the log-likelihood of
seeing the election outcome produced in the Wisconsin plan averaged
across the shifted elections.
The above statistic is symmetric in that it measures if anomalous
results favors one political party over the other, not which party.
Using a second set of statistics, we measure if one party is favored
over the other by the Wisconsin plan. For each party, we measure (i)
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Fig. 4. The number of seats elected when the percentage in each district is shifted so
that the global fraction of the vote for the Republicans ranges between 0.45 and 0.55.
Results of WSA14(left) and WSA16(right) are shown. Horizontal lines mark the level
of the original vote. Vertical lines mark the number of seats require for a majority and
a super-majority.
what fraction of redistricting plans from our ensemble produce fewer
legislative seats than the state’s plan, and (ii) take the minimum of
these fractions across all the shifts considered above. As before, for
any election, we then measure the extent to which a state’s plan is an
outlier with respect to these statistics measuring party bias. In each
of the three elections (2012, 2014, and 2016), the Wisconsin plan is
more favorable to the Republicans with respect to this statistic than
99% of all possible redistricting plans in our ensemble. In contrast,
the percentage of plans that favor the Democrats less at some shift is
much smaller (only 3%, 73%, and 8% in the 2012, 2014, and 2016
elections respectively). See the values of Lrep and Ldem in Table 2 in
Section 4). We will further see that, in the contexts in which the Act
43 map aids Democrats, its effect is to make a large GOP majority
somewhat smaller. In Section 7, we also consider a complementary
approach in which we assess shifts of up to ±7.5% centered around
the outcomes of each election. Wisconsin’s plan is again seen to be
an extreme outlier.
In the next section, we explain why the Wisconsin plan is such
an outlier by exploring the structure of the vote in more detail. The
graphical understanding of the structure of the vote developed in
the next section, and Figure 7 in particular, is encapsulated in the
Gerrymandering Index defined in (3). In Section 4, we explore the
Gerrymandering Index of the Wisconsin plan over a number of histor-
ical Wisconsin elections (WSA12, WSA14, WSA16, Governor 2012,
US House 2012 and 2014, US Senate 2012 and 2016, Wisconsin
Secretary of State 2014, and Presidential 2012 and 2016). Again
situating the result in our ensemble, we fine that at worse 98% of our
ensemble had a better Gerrymandering Index. For the majority of the
elections considered, none of the redistrictings in our ensemble had a
worst Gerrymandering score (See Table 1 in Section 1).
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Fig. 5. Partisan composition of Wisconsin General Assemble as a function of global
Republican vote using shifted WSA12(top), WSA14(middle), WSA16(bottom) votes.
Vertical line indicates the actual votes in unshifted data. Horizontal lines mark seats
needed for majority and super-majority. Thin line shows seats in Wisconsin redistrict-
ing.
3. Exposing the Geopolitical Structure of Wisconsin
To understand the structure which leads to the results of the previous
section, we repeat the marginal analysis developed in (2, 3). Fixing
a set of votes, for each redistricting we calculate the percentage of
Republican votes and then place this vector of 99 numbers in increas-
ing order. To gain insight into the distribution of this 99-dimensional
vector when varied over our ensemble, we plot a box-plot for each
marginal direction. As standard in box-plots, the box contains 50%
of the values, the outer whiskers bracket whichever is smaller – 1.5
times the interquartile range from each quartile or the furthest outlier
– and the central line through the box marks the median value.
The resulting 99 box-plots arranged on one graph for WSA12,
WSA14, and WSA16 give insight into the inherent geopolitical geom-
etry of Wisconsin due to the interaction of the state’s geometry with
population density and partisan distribution (Figure 7). We see that
typically there are at least 25 districts with less then 40% Democratic
vote.
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Fig. 6. We plot the distribution of H indices, defined in Section 4, for each set of
voting data. In all cases, we find that the Wisconsin Act 43 redistricting plan is an
extreme outlier when compared with the ensemble.
These plots give provide a method to determine the typical partisan
makeup of each district. This inherently reflects the geopolitical
structure of the state. For a given redistricting plan, if a given district’s
percentage falls below the horizontal 50% line then the district elects
a Republican. If it falls above the line, it elects a Democrat. This
plot has proven useful in detecting redistricting plans with packed or
fractured districts. See (3, 14). In some sense, they give quantitative
definitions to these concepts.
If a given district’s Democratic vote percentage is at the bottom or
below the box plot, the district has fewer Democrats than expected.
If the percentage is above or at the top of the box plot, the district
has more Democrats than expected. It is clear that the Wisconsin
Act 43 redistricting plan produces election results with Democratic
votes depleted from the center of the plot and places those votes in
the districts which already have a large number of Democratic voters.
We also understand why the actual results of the WSA12 elections
were not representative while the actual results of the WSA14 and
WSA16 elections were representative. It is simply a result of where
the 50% line hits the box plot graph in Figure 7. If the 50% line
crosses the graph in the region in which the location of the current
Wisconsin redistricting plan (the red dots) falls outside of the boxplot
(which encodes typical behavior) then the results will be anomalous.
This is the case in WSA12 but not in WSA 14 and WSA16. On the
other hand, in all three years the district corresponding to the 50th seat,
which dictates who is in the majority, is always an outlier, requiring
less Republican votes than expected.
A. Inherent Lack of Proportionality. Notice that there is a struc-
tural tilt to the Republicans – in all of our analyses, a 50% vote
fraction for both parties leads to a majority of Republicans. We see
that one only needs the Republican vote to be around 47% to 49%
to obtain 50 seats with the structure of the WSA12 votes over the
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Fig. 7. Box-plot summary of districts ordered from most Republican to most Demo-
cratic, for the voting data from WSA12 (top), WSA14 (middle), WSA16 (bottom). We
compare our statistical results with Wisconsin redistricting in each case.
majority of redistricting plans. Similarly, WSA14 and WSA16 re-
quire between 46% and 47% Republican vote fractions and between
45% and 46% Republican vote fractions, respectively, to obtain 50
seats. This shows clearly that it is not reasonable to expect that 50%
of the vote leads to 50% of the seats. This does not explain all of
the shift in the Republican favor produced by the Wisconsin Act 43
redistricting plan. Our analysis allows us to separate out the effect of
the geopolitical landscape, and to show that the Act 43 map generates
extreme partisan asymmetry above and beyond this effect.
B. Exploring Parity. To further explore the impact of the structure
in Figures 5 and 7, we explore two ideas around parity. We begin by
shifting the votes in WSA12, WSA14, and WSA16 so that there are
an equal number of redistricting plans in the ensemble in which the
Republicans and Democrats are in the majority. When shifting the
votes in this way, the Wisconsin Act 43 redistricting produces signif-
icantly more Republican seats – 56 with WSA12, 57 with WSA14,
and 54 with WSA16. In the first two cases, this is a result seen in very
few redistricting plans of the ensemble redistricting plans while in
WSA16 it has a very low probability (that is to say a relatively small
number redistricting plans compared to the just under 20,000 plans
considered in the ensemble).
Of course, one could perform a similar analysis around another
point than the 50% mark. One can see whether if the Wisconsin
redistricting would still be an outlier when the votes are centered
around a different line by drawing a vertical line in Figure 5 at a
different value and noting where the thin black line corresponding
to the Wisconsin Act 43 redistricting crosses this vertical line. For
instance for WSA12, any vertical line up to at least 52% and above
41% results in a result with Wisconsin Act 43 which is well outside the
results of 90% of the ensemble – very few redistricting plans which
give this result exist in the ensemble. Similar in WSA14 from about
43% to 50.5% the results produced by Wisconsin Act 43 are outliers
as they lie outside the region containing 5% to 95% of the ensemble.
Lastly for WSA16, from 42% to 50% the Wisconsin redistricting
produces results which are outside the region containing 5% to 95%
of the ensemble. In all cases the results are skewed to the Republicans
precisely in the region where the Democrats threaten to move into the
majority.
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Fig. 8. Histogram of Republican seats won when WSA12 (top), WSA14 (middle),
WSA16 (botom) shifted so that half of the redistricting plans lead to a majority for
either party.
A complimentary perspective is instead to ask to what percentage
of Republican vote does one have to shift the election to produce a
50/50 split of the seats with a given redistricting. A histogram of the
quantity tabulated over the ensemble is shown in Figure 9 along with
the percentage needed for the Wisconsin Act 43 redistricting plan.
Again we see there is a systematic tilt towards the Republicans built
into the geopolitical structure of the state. However, in all cases the
percentage needed to produce parity in the Wisconsin Act 43 plan is
abnormally low.
4. Summary Statistics
We now develop a number of summary statistics that highlight and
make quantitative the graphical analysis developed in the last section.
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Gerrymandering Index. We begin by calculating the Gerrymandering
Index developing in (3). It measures the extent to which a particular
redistricting has districts whose vote margins for each election deviate
from what is expected in Figure 7. For a given election, the square of
the Gerrymandering index is the sum of the square deviations of each
of the sorted Democratic percentages from the means of the marginals
in the ninety-nine box-plots in Figure 7. To contextualize the Gerry-
mandering Index, we situate a given score within the distribution of
scores from our ensemble of redistricting plans. Redistricting plans
which have unusually large Gerrymandering index should be view as
Gerrymandered. The percentage of the ensemble with Gerrymander-
ing Index worst than the Wisconsin Act 43 redistricting is shown in
Table 1 for a number of different sets of votes from different years.
In all cases, the Wisconsin Act 43 redistricting is seen to have an
unusually high level of the Gerrymandering Index.
Representative Index. The Gerrymandering Index directly measures
how anomalous the partisan composition of a redistricting is. It is pos-
sible for a redistricting to be gerrymandered, yet still be representative
of the vote count, as we have seen in Figure 1 for WSA14 and WSA16.
Therefore, we also measure how representative a redistricting is in the
context of different vote counts.
In (3), we also define a Representative Index which quantifies how
representative the result obtained by using a particular redistricting
and vote combination is. It is essentially the distance from the mean
value in the histograms in Figure 1 when one extends the number of
seats won by a given party to a continuous variable in a natural way.
See (3) for the details. As with the Gerrymandering Index, in Table 1
we postion the Representative Index inside the ensemble of redistrict-
ing plans by reporting the percentage of the ensemble with a larger
index. It is worth noting that Table 1 shows the same dependence
of representativeness reflected in the histograms in Figures 3 and 4
Voting data % more gerry-
mandered
% less represen-
tative
Rep. Vote
Fraction.
WSA16 0.01 87.98 52.91
GOV12 0 48.61 52.59
USH14 0.09 46.78 51.89
WSA14 0 82.34 51.28
USS16 0 40.93 51.09
WSA12 0 0.44 50.05
PRE16 1.52 60.00 49.91
USH12 0 25.02 48.68
USS12 0 0 46.65
PRE12 0 0 45.98
Table 1. We show the percentage of redistricting plans within the
ensemble that are (i) more gerrymandered and (ii) less representative
than Wisconsin Act 43 redistricting; we also display the republican
vote fraction. According to all vote counts, the current Wisconsin
plan is highly gerrymandered. There is a strong correlation between
Republican vote fraction and Representativeness. (PRE = President,
WAG=Attorney General, GOV= Governor, USS= US Senate, USH=US
House)
and the plots in Figure 5. As the global percentage of Republicans
decreases towards 50% the representative score begins to drop. The
effect is not strictly monotone as the geopolitical structure of each
vote also plays a role.
Representativeness Measured Across Shifts. From the preceding sec-
tion, it is clear that the overall percentage of the vote as well as its
geopolitical structure can have a large effect on the perceived rep-
resentativeness of a redistricting, even when the Gerrymandering
Index reports a high level of gerrymandering. To control for this, we
consider shifts of a given collection of votes much in the spirit of
Figure 4.
Rather than use the Representative Index from (3), we consider an
alternative formulation which measures the negative log probability
of the observed elevation outcome using the probabilities from our
ensemble. We then sum these values over a number of shifts of
the original election. The logarithmic measure more naturally lives
on the same scale across different elections and hence seems more
appropriate for this context. This measure, which we will denote by
H , is essentially an average log-likelihood across the different shifts
We compliment this nonpartisan statistic with one designed to
measure deviations in the Republicans’s advantage, denoted by Lrep,
and one to measure deviations in the Democrats’s advantage, denoted
by Ldem. In Table 1, we see based on the H statistics that the Wiscon-
sin Act 43 districts are outliers being much less representative than
most of the redistricting plans in the ensemble. The L statistic shows
that the Wisconsin redistricting is tilted to favor the Republicans. In
one year the Ldem raises to the almost 75%; however the box-plots
in Figure 7 show that the benefit to Democrats comes in elections
where the Republicans hold a strong majority in any event, so that the
benefit does not affect majority control.
To capture the representativeness over a range of election out-
comes, we consider shifted election votes over a range of outcomes.
We consider a measure which registers both the worst-case deviation
from the typical and one which measures the average deviation.
Fixing a set of votes to evaluate election outcomes, we define
the index `rep to be the minimum, overall shifts of the percentage
Republican vote between 45% and 55%, of the probability that the
number of Republican seats for a given map is greater than one drawn
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from our distribution. We estimate this probability using the ensemble
we generated. We then define Lrep to be the fraction of maps in our
ensemble for which `rep is greater than it is for the map in question.
We define `dem and Ldem in the same fashion but with Republicans
replaced by Democrats.
The L statistics described above compare the worst case between
two redistricting plans and are inherently one-sided, hence the Demo-
cratic and Republican versions. It is also useful to consider a statistic
which is an average over a range of shifts. Again fixing a set of votes
and a redistricting to be investigated, we define h to be the sum over
a set of shifts of the logarithm of the probability that two of the redis-
tricting plans in question produce the same number of Republicans
as a random redistricting drawn from our distribution. As with the
preceding statistic, we determine a sense of scale for h by defining H
to be the probability that the h of a given redistricting is greater than
a randomly drawn redistricting from our ensemble.
H Lrep Ldem
WSA12 100% 99.833% 3.253%
WSA14 99.990% 99.765% 72.785%
WSA16 99.223% 99.656% 7.892%
Table 2. Summary statistics measuring representativeness for Wis-
consin Act 43 redistricting. These numbers give the percent of re-
districting plans the Wisconsin Act 43 redistricting is worse than in
terms of average (H), Republican favoritism (Lrep), and Democratic
favoritism (Ldem).
The results in Table 2 show that the results are clearly anomalous.
The values of H for the Wisconsin plan are extreme outliers within
our ensemble. By detecting unrepresentativeness over a range of
shifts, the H statistic assess the level of gerrymandering in the range
of total vote fractions where elections typically occur.
We now clarify these definitions by restating them in more math-
ematical notation. We begin by fixing some notation. For any redis-
tricting pi and s ∈ R, we let pi + s to be the vote obtained by shifting
the partisan vote s% to the Republicans. Let rep(pi) and dem(pi)
denote respectively the total percent Republican or Democratic vote
in the election pi. Now for any redistricting ξ, we let Rep(ξ, pi) and
Dem(ξ, pi) be the total number of seats won by respectively the Re-
publicans and Democrats with vote pi and redistricting ξ.
Now we define
`rep(ξ, pi) = min
s∈[45,55]−r(pi)
P
(
Rep
(
Ξ, pi + s
)
≥ Rep(ξ, pi + s
))
`dem(ξ, pi) = min
s∈[45,55]−r(pi)
P
(
Dem
(
Ξ, pi + s
)
≥ Dem
(
ξ, pi + s
))
where Ξ is a redistricting chosen uniformly from our ensemble
and [45, 55] − r(pi) is compact notation for the set of shifts [45 −
r(pi), 55− r(pi)]. We then situate these probabilities in the ensemble
by defining
Lrep(ξ, pi) = P
(
`rep(Ξ, pi) ≤ `rep(ξ, pi)
)
Ldem(ξ, pi) = P
(
`dem(Ξ, pi) ≤ `dem(ξ, pi)
)
where Ξ is again a randomly chosen redistricting from the ensemble.
To define the averaged representative index, we define the average
log-likelihood
h(ξ, pi) = − 1|I|
∑
s∈I−r(pi)
log P
(
Rep
(
Ξ, pi+s
)
= Rep
(
ξ, pi+s
))
where Ξ is chosen according to our distribution on redistricting plans
and I = {45, 45.5, . . . , 54.5, 55}, I − x is the shifted set defined as
before by I − x = {y − x : y ∈ I}, and |I| is the number of points
in I . We then situate these in the ensemble by defining
H(ξ, pi) = P
(
h(ξ, pi) ≥ h(Ξ, pi)
)
.
In calculating H , we extrapolate the observed histogram using a
Gaussian tail approximation whenever a values is needed outside the
range observed in the histogram.
We report the summary statistics in Table 2. We find that the
Wisconsin Act 43 redistricting is an extreme outlier in terms of how
probable it is to observe its value of H . We also find that in the worst
case, it can benefit the Republicans by more than 99% of all redis-
tricting plans in our ensemble. Conversely, when shifting between
45%-55% of the vote fraction, the Democrats are significantly im-
peded in WSA12 and WSA16, and are aided to a much lesser degree
in other elections and vote shifts. We remark that when we re-examine
Figure 5, the Democrats are only ‘aided,’ once the Republicans have
obtained a super majority, as can be seen by the thin continuous line
falling below the 90% region.
5. Generating the Ensemble of Redistricting Plans
Our method begins by first placing a probability distribution on all
the reasonable redistricting plans. The probability distribution will
be concentrated on redistricting plans which better satisfy the design
certain specified in the laws and legal precedents covering redistricting
plans in Wisconsin. We then draw an ensemble of redistricting using
the classical Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm. The frequency of
redistricting plans with different qualities will depend on how well
those districts satisfy the design criteria.
A. The Distribution on Redistricting Plans. Following the pre-
scription from (3) (see also (1, 14)), we consider distributions with a
density proportional to
e−βJ(ξ)
where ξ is the function which assigns to each ward a district which we
label with the numbers 1 to 99 for convenience. The score function J
will be the sum of a number of different score functions
J(ξ) =wcompJcomp(ξ) + wpopJpop(ξ)
+ wcountyJcounty(ξ) + wvraJvra(ξ)
where Jcomp(ξ) measures compactness, Jpop(ξ) measure population
deviation from the ideal, Jcounty(ξ) the number of counties split
across counties, and Jvra(ξ) measures the compliance with the Voting
Rights Act (VRA); the wi’s are positive weights. In all cases, low
scores will correspond to better compliance with the associated design
criteria.
We will use the population and compactness score functions from
(3). The county and VRA score functions will versions of those from
(3) with modifications to adapt to the details of the Wisconsin redis-
tricting context. The Wisconsin State Assembly (WSA) districting
required that many counties and towns be split into more than two
districts (in contrast to the work in (3)). Hence minor alterations were
required to our previous score functions.
We determine the weight parameters with a nearly identical pro-
cess to that described in (3). We have determined wpop = 2200,
wcomp = 0.8, wcounty = 0.6, wV RA = 100.
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B. Markov Chain Monte Carlo Sampling. We sample redistricting
plans according to the algorithm presented (3). For simulated anneal-
ing parameters, we take 20,000 accepted steps at β = 0, 80,000
accepted steps as β linearly increasing to one, and 20, 000 steps for
β = 1 ( see (3) for more details about the meaning of these pa-
rameters). In our reported ensemble we take 19,184 samples. In
Section 7, we show evidence that this is sufficient to correctly sample
the distribution on redistricting plans.
C. Redistricting Plans in the Ensemble. We ensure that the dis-
tricts are contiguous, all redistricting plans are more compact than the
Wisconsin Act 43 plan. We only kept samples such that the maximum
population deviation is below 5%. To account for the VRA, we only
retain redistricting plans containing six districts that have at least 40%
African Americans and one district that has at least a 40% Hispanic
population. All sampled redistricting plans are described at the ward
level, and no ward is split.
With the above criteria, we have account for all districting criteria
present in the Wisconsin constitution, with the exception of splitting
townships. We also gather a smaller number of samples (2043) from a
distribution that concentrates on redistricting plans that also preserve
townships. The township consideration requires an additional term in
the score function, and is similar in form to the county splitting energy.
We compare the effect of preserving townships below in Section 7.
6. Interpolating Election Data
We now explain how we interpolate the election data which is miss-
ing due to unopposed races. Let Vtot(i), Vdem(i), and Vrep(i) be
respectively the total vote, the Democratic vote, and the Republi-
can vote in ward i. We split the ward indices into the good G and
B wards. Typically the wards in B are the wards where the race
is unopposed. We also make use of a second set of voting data
(Utot(i), Udem(i), Urep(i)) for which no data is missing. We begin
by considering the pairs (Utot(i), Vtot(i)) : i ∈ {1, . . . 99}which we
assume to be sorted by the first value. To interpolate Vtot(i) for some
i ∈ B, we select the pairs{
(Utot(i−2), Vtot(i−2)), (Utot(i−1), Vtot(i−1)),
(Utot(i1), Vtot(i1)), (Utot(i2), Vtot(i2))
}
where i1 and i2 are the next two elements in the increasing or-
dered sequence of Utot values after Utot(i) so that i1, i2 ∈ G.
Similarly Utot(i−2) and Utot(i−1) are the previous two elements
in the ordered sequence again so that both indices are in G. If
no such point exists, we proceed with the points we have. We
then perform a linear least-squares fit to this collection of points.
Observe that there are always at least two points in the collec-
tion. We then evaluate this linear fit at the point Utot(i) to obtain
our estimate of Vtot(i) which we will denote by V̂tot(i). Then,
in the same fashion, we estimate ρrep(i) = Urep(i)/Utot(i) and
ρdem(i) = Udem(i)/Utot(i) with rrep(i) = Vrep(i)/Vtot(i) and
rdem(i) = Vdem(i)/Vtot(i) to obtain ρ̂rep(i) and ρ̂dem(i). We
then set V̂rep(i) to be the average of floor(ρ̂rep(i)V̂tot(i)) and
V̂tot(i))− ρ̂dem(i)V̂tot(i)) and similarly V̂dem(i) to be the average
of ρ̂dem(i)V̂tot(i) and V̂tot(i))− ρ̂rep(i)V̂tot(i). For each choice of
reference vote (Utot(i), Udem(i), Urep(i)), we obtain such an esti-
mate. In some cases, we obtain multiple such estimates associated
with different reference votes. We then average all of the estimates to
obtain a finial estimate which we then round to the nearest integer.
To decide which of the many possible combinations of reference
votes (Utot(i), Udem(i), Urep(i)) produce the best results, we also
Election to interpolate Reference elections
WSA12 PRE12, USS12, USH12
WSA14 GOV14, WAG14
WSA16 PRE16, USS16
Table 3. Data used to interpolate Wisconsin State Assembly date.
See Table 1 for abbreviations.
predict the values for the i ∈ G and select the collection of reference
votes which produces the smallest total squared error. This leads to
the choices of reference votes presented in Table 3 in the following
elections with unopposed elections.
In 2012 and 2014, the interpolated votes yield the same number of
seats with the Wisconsin Act 43 maps as the original vote counts with
the unopposed races not interpolated. In 2016, the number of seats
changed from 64 to 67. To understand why this occurred, observe
that districts 54, 73 and 74 were uncontested by Republicans and thus
went to the Democratic candidate; however the votes in these districts
leaned Republican for the President and the Senate, explaining why
the interpolated result disagrees with the actual result.
7. Robustness of Results
To check the robustness of our results, we (i) take longer runs, and
(ii) generate a second ensemble in which we additionally account
for town splitting. In considering more runs, we extend our sam-
pling algorithms to examine 84500 redistricting plans. This extended
sampling tests whether we have appropriately sampled the space of
redistricting plans. The box plots are the most detailed of our results
and all other results may be derived from the data contained within
them; to show even more detail we present marginal histogram plots.
We plot the marginal histograms of the extended samples compared
with the reported samples in Figure 10. We find the histogram struc-
tures are visually identical for WSA12, WSA14, and WSA16 voting
data which provides evidence that we have appropriately sampled the
space of redistricting plans.
To consider the effect of keeping townships contiguous, we add a
fifth term to the score function that is similar to the county splitting
score reported in (3). We consider townships to be all wards with the
same name within the shapefile provided by the Legislative Technol-
ogy Services Bureau (15). For example, using this criteria the city of
Wausau is comprised of 41 wards. The new score function is weighted
with a value of 0.005, which we have found only marginally affects
the overall districting compactness and keeps townships together in a
similar way to that of the current plan in Wisconsin. We sample 2043
redistricting plans that preserve townships.
We compare the marginal histogram plots when considering town-
ship splitting and for the ensemble we have reported above in Figure
11. We find the histogram structures are visually identical for WSA12,
WSA14, and WSA16 voting data. Because this new ensemble predicts
identical district level results, we have evidence that (1) the ensemble
used throughout the paper is robust and (2) reflects all of Wisconsin’s
stated redistricting criteria according to the state constitution.
Lastly, we considered alternative definitions of the summary statis-
tics H , Lrep, and Ldem. Instead of shifting the election data so the
resulting global elections margins varied between 45% and 55% on
might want to take a symmetric interval around the actual global elec-
tions margins. Taking a range of ±7.5% for the shift, we produced
a second set statistics: H˜ , L˜rep, and L˜dem. Again we see that the
Wisconsin’s plan is still an extreme outlier. The only change is that
the L˜rep statistic is much higher. As we discuss bellow, this is because
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Fig. 10. Testing the effect of using an ensemble with more samples.
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Fig. 11. Testing the effect of favoring townships not being split by district boundaries
on the districting results.
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H˜ L˜rep L˜dem
WSA12 100% 99.593% 73.718%
WSA14 99.99% 99.505% 91.232%
WSA16 97.795% 99.004% 87.484%
the range now includes a range of percentages where the Wisconsin
plan causes the Democrats to perform better than expected in the
typical plan. However the results in this range have little effect on
the balance of power as the Republicans are already solidly in the
majority in those elections.
We prefer H , Lrep, and Ldem to H˜ , L˜rep, and L˜dem because the
range is limited to 45% to 55%. While the others are more symmetric,
they often pull information from the low 60% or high 30% in global
vote. These ranges seem less relevant. The effect of this difference is
seen in the values of L˜dem which is much higher than Ldem because
in includes elections with a large global percentage of Republican
votes. From Figure 7, we see that the Democratic votes depleted
from districts with partisen make up around 50% often is packed
into districts with more that 60%. This causes a tilt in favore of the
Democrats from what is expected should the global vote get that high.
Of course if the vote is above 60% Republican, a few seats shifted to
the Democrats will have little effect operationally.
8. Adjustments to Wisconsin General Assembly Redis-
tricting
Data provided in (15) is incomplete in terms of the current redistricting
plan for Wisconsin. We provide the script that we used to assign
districts to unreported wards in our repository. The number of wards
affected is relatively small.
9. Supplementary Materials
Database with redistricting plans and other data:
git@git.math.duke.edu:gjh/WIRedistrictingData.git
10. Acknowledgements
This work uses a code base initiated by Han Sung Kang and Justin
Luo as part of a Data+ project under the supervision of the authors
at Duke University. We thank the Information Initiative at Duke and
the Mathematics Department for their support. We would also like
to thank Moon Duchin, Assaf Bar-Natan, and Mira Bernstein for
their guidance on districting criteria in Wisconsin and assistance with
gathering and extracting data. We are also indebted to Eric Lander for
useful discussions and debates around the meaning and presentation
of these results as well as Jordan Ellenberg’s insightful comments on
a previous draft. We are also indebted to Venessa Barnett-Loro for
helping to polish this report.
1. Mattingly JC, Vaughn C (2014) Redistricting and the Will of the People. ArXiv e-prints.
2. Tom Ross, POLIS center at Duke (2016) Beyond gerrymandering project (See
https://sites.duke.edu/polis/projects/beyond-gerrymandering/).
3. Bangia S, et al. (2017) Redistricting: Drawing the Line. ArXiv e-prints.
4. Thoreson JD, Liittschwager JM (1967) Computers in behavioral science. legislative districting
by computer simulation. Systems Research and Behavioral Science 12(3):237–247.
5. Gearhart BC, Liittschwager JM (1969) Legislative districting by computer. Systems Research
and Behavioral Science 14(5):404–417.
6. Wu LC, Dou JX, Sleator D, Frieze A, Miller D (2015) Impartial redistricting: A markov chain
approach. arXiv:1510.03247v1.
7. Chen J, Rodden J (2015) Cutting through the thicket: Redistricting simulations and the detec-
tion of partisan gerrymanders. Election Law Journal 14(4):331–345.
8. Liu YY, Cho WKT, Wang S (2016) Pear: a massively parallel evolutionary computation ap-
proach for political redistricting optimization and analysis. Swarm and Evolutionary Compu-
tation 30:78–92.
9. Fifield B, Higgins M, Imai K, Tarr A (2015) A new automated redistricting simulator using
markov chain monte carlo. Work. Pap., Princeton Univ., Princeton, NJ.
10. Chikina M, Frieze A, Pegden W (2017) Assessing significance in a markov chain without
mixing. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114(11):2860–2864.
11. Wang SSH (2016) Three tests for practical evaluation of partisan gerrymandering. Stanford
Law Review 68:1263–1322.
12. Chen J (2017) The impact of political geography on wisconsin redistricting: An analysis of
wisconsin’s act 43 assembly districting plan. Election Law Journal.
13. Chikina M, Frieze A, Pegden W (2017) An analysis of the Act 43 Wisconsin Assembly district
map using the
√
ε test. ArXiv e-prints.
14. Bangia S, Dou B, Mattingly JC, Guo S, Vaughn C (2015) Quantifying gerrymandering
(https://services.math.duke.edu/projects/gerrymandering/).
15. (2017) Shape file web pages (http://data-ltsb.opendata.arcgis.com/datasets/
2012-2020-wi-election-data-with-2017-wards). Last Modfied: 2017-08-31 00:23:26
+0000.
10 | Herschlag et al.
